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This vast, heavily detailed and deeply researched book presents an account of the 
diplomatic history of the “West New Guinea problem” and thus of the political fate of 
the people and territory of western New Guinea.  In just over 800 pages, Professor 
Drooglever describes the painful and always vexed history of the incorporation of the 
peoples of the western segment of the island of New Guinea (an “originally very 
primitive society”, p. 14) into the modern world.  It is a tragic, bitter and frustrating 
story, one of marginality, powerlessness, and the victory of primordial moral certainty 
(however misplaced) and cynicism over weakly-grounded good intentions. 
 
Basing himself upon an unrivalled knowledge of the diplomatic sources, and 
employing a great talent for synthesis and a drily witty and compact style, Drooglever 
traces the history of the peoples of west Papua in fourteen chapters.  He tells the story 
of the cultural distance of most of Papua’s people from the more western peoples of 
the Indonesian archipelago, the slow and incomplete efforts of Dutch colonialism to 
lay claim to and then begin to govern the western part of the island (for strategic, not 
economic, advantage), the growing sense amongst the Dutch (and some Papuans as 
well) that New Guinea was not quite like the rest of their Netherlands Indies and 
therefore needed to be treated differently, the multi-purposed, gradually arrived at, but 
ultimately disastrous decision not to hand over the territory to the newly-created 
Republic of the United States of Indonesia in 1949, the consequently accelerating 
tensions between Indonesia and the Netherlands when the former realised that New 
Guinea would not easily and naturally fall into its grasp and when the Dutch, for their 
part, began a new colonial project in the region, the bitter, troubling negotiations, 
partly a product of gathering Dutch doubts about its own capacity and the measure of 
international support it might receive, which finally placed the territory first under 
UN, then Indonesian, administration in 1962-63, and finally the fateful “Act of Free 
Choice” which finally delivered the territory unconditionally but by no means 
unreservedly to Indonesia.  
 
There is much to praise in this huge and complex work.  Most obviously, there is the 
breadth of research and the meticulous scholarship focussed on archival collections in 
three countries, a number of interviews, and a broad list of ancillary secondary works.  
There are, further, the skills of synthesis and organisation which bring together this 
multi-faceted work into a solid, readable, stylish unity.  There is, as well, a certain 
dispassionateness in the prose, an almost unfashionable sense that there is an 
objective truth to be uncovered, and that the way to uncover it is through a diligent, 
detached and disinterested reading of the paper record of government actions.  
Whatever one may think of this mode of analysis, it does leave the reader with the 
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sense that this book is and will remain the definitive work on this subject; no one else 
will have the patience, skill, deftness and opportunity to perform anything like this 
piece on investigation again.  It sheds new light and new detail on aspects of the 
story—for example, the complex meshing of factors which gave birth to the 
Netherlands’ New Guinea policy in the immediate post-war period—and does so with 
an enormous comprehensiveness and totalising quality.  There can be no doubt this 
work will serve as essential primary reading for anyone seriously interested in this 
subject in the future.  Which, of course, raises the question as to why it was published 
in the Dutch language, something which, notwithstanding the many virtues of that 
language, must certainly hinder the book’s capacity to be read, absorbed and learned 
from in broader international circles, and notably in Indonesia itself. 
 
Drooglever’s account can be read on many levels and in many ways.  At one level it is 
the story of a failed imperial project: the retreat of the Netherlands from the status of 
imposing imperial power to that of a relatively insignificant little country of western 
Europe, and the effects that change in status had both upon its leaders and those upon 
whom they wished to exercise distant power.  At another level still, it may be read as 
a sad parable of powerlessness and marginality, a powerlessness that exhibited itself 
in profound ways at different times—the powerlessness of the Indonesians, at least 
those attached to the Republic, both to halt the Dutch federal project and, later, to 
prevent the Dutch retaining control of New Guinea after the transfer of sovereignty in 
1949;  the powerlessness of the Dutch, once sovereignty had been transferred, and 
once the combination of Cold War realism and Third World revulsion at imperialism 
combined to render their efforts to make something better of New Guinea completely 
hopeless.  Most of all, this is a story of the powerlessness of Papuans themselves:  
colonised, undeveloped, fought over, bartered with, encouraged, betrayed, and then 
colonised again.  That Papuans are so passive, so victimised and, indeed, that they 
play so insignificant a part in the overall narrative of the book is instructive and 
sobering indeed. Third, the book might be read as an unflattering account of 
diplomatic process:  the effusive claims and grandiloquence, the moral 
grandstandings, the game of bluff and counterbluff (always with peoples lives and 
futures hanging in the balance), of miscalculation, of claims to power where there was 
no power, of ruthless arrogance, the inconsistencies and illogicalities of policy from 
time to time, and always the overhanging sense that the problem, made in the first 
instance by the Dutch, would never be solved by the Dutch. 
 
In reviewing this complex issue over the longer period of twentieth century history, 
one is tempted to think against the grain and to wonder whether this terrible tale really 
had to play itself out in this way.  In that sense, though on a much smaller scale, there 
is a kind of essential insolubility to the problem here that inevitably brings the Middle 
East to mind.  But might anything have been done to make things different, and 
better?  Right from the beginning, things seemed to have been stacked against the 
Papuans.  Apart from the fact that they had the misfortune to be colonised at all, they 
were colonised by a small and uninfluential European power whose capacity to carve 
out an Indies empire was essentially a result of the strategic disposition of larger 
world powers at the time.  Second, the Dutch, busy with other parts of the Indies, and 
by the 1930s economically crippled by the Depression, never attempted to make much 
of this part of the Indies.  New Guinea’s major fame—or rather notoriety—came from 
the fact that it housed the notorious Digul internment camp for Indonesian political 
dissidents.  Third, after 1942, the Dutch, completely overwhelmed by the Japanese, 
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then caught sleeping by the ferocity and reach of the nascent independence movement 
under Sukarno, were always scrambling to make up time and power in the 
archipelago, and that weakness in turn prompted them to attempt to demonstrate a 
power they no longer really enjoyed.  The result was the crucial, foolish and 
catastrophic decision, slowly and almost inadvertently come to, to attempt to hold on 
to New Guinea in the context of the general decolonisation of Indonesia.  That, in 
retrospect was the crucial moment.   
 
Thereafter, though the Dutch triumphed at the time, it was the most empty and, for the 
people of Papua, the most damaging of victories.  Thereafter, the story is one of 
foolish optimism and inevitable decline for Dutch interests in the face of world 
opinion which increasingly turned sour, and a determined Indonesian offensive to 
claim what it considered its own as of right.  Had the Dutch handed over the territory 
with the rest of Indonesia in 1949, the problem would never have arisen (though the 
fate of Papuans themselves might not necessarily have been any better).  On their 
good intentions, to provide an eventual and meaningful right of self-determination to 
the Papuan peoples, whatever their confused moral and political bases, was a policy 
set in train which could never succeed in the reigning context and which inevitably 
brought sorrow and death to many.   
 
At a fundamental level, the problem of Dutch efforts to preserve New Guinea as its 
own, and eventually to allow it to pass to its own form of freedom, was based on a 
almost complete failure to understand the nature and tenacity of Indonesian 
nationalism.  That central failure is captured in this book, but in ways, I suspect, that 
the author did not intend.  Drooglever’s noble efforts to deliver the facts on the New 
Guinea problem fail for precisely the same reason numerous Dutch governments did:  
an inability to appreciate the depth and frustrating constancy of post-war Indonesian 
nationalism.  That is this book’s greatest flaw. 
 
Drooglever’s project, as he notes in his foreword, is “to write a study of the relations 
between the Netherlands and New Guinea, the conflict with Indonesia which flowed 
from that, and the series of events in relation to the Act of Free Choice” (p. 12).  He 
notes the fact that, notwithstanding the best efforts of Dutch authorities, the 
Indonesian government was unwilling to cooperate in the study.  It is party because of 
this difficulty that the archival sources are essentially those of countries which were 
generally as unsympathetic to the nature and power of Indonesian nationalism as the 
Dutch themselves.  This source basis, together with the original intention with which 
the work was conceptualised, immediately means that the history we read is written, 
as it were, over the shoulder of numerous Dutch officials and diplomats.  Equally, it 
means that the Indonesian side of the story is presented in essentially ahistorical and 
sometimes puzzling terms which inevitably cast the Indonesian actors as stubborn and 
unyielding belligerents who have no sense of the noble virtues of self-determination 
and fairness. 
 
It would be foolish not to acknowledge the double-dealing, cynicism and outright 
intolerance and cruelty and which characterised much of the Indonesian diplomatic, 
military and political effort to claim New Guinea as an integral part of Indonesia.  At 
the same time, however, it does not assist the untutored to appreciate the utter 
complexity of the situation if the key dimension of the Indonesian nationalist impulse 
is left unexplained, or cast in terms designed to deny it any kind of moral privilege. 
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A prominent feature of early post-war Dutch understandings of the Republican 
upsurge, notably in Java and Sumatra, was that the Republican leadership, notably 
Sukarno himself, were not truly representative of a broader social movement to 
achieve freedom.  While it was certainly true that the Republican movement was most 
strongly anchored in Java and Sumatra, and that it found—for reasons to do with 
Dutch colonial policy, Japanese wartime administrative decisions and the area’s early 
liberation—less fertile ground in parts of eastern Indonesia, Dutch efforts to capitalise 
on that relative weakness in the form of a federal movement proved a failure when the 
second police action finally provoked the United Nations—that is, the Americans—to 
intercede on the part of the Republic.  The attitude of the federal states was, if 
anything, even more aggressively nationalist than that of the Republic in the lead up 
to and in the course of the Round Table negotiations of 1949.  Thereafter, the federal 
experiment—viewed as a remnant of recalcitrant colonialism by the Republic—
quickly collapsed, something that itself stimulated the desire to complete the project 
of achieving freedom for the whole territory of the Republic of the August 1945 
proclamation. 
 
Drooglever goes on to document the detail of the decline in Indonesian-Dutch 
relations which followed the failure of the Dutch to do what the Indonesians had 
expected—hand over New Guinea.  In his discussion, he pits a relentless and cajoling 
Indonesia against a Netherlands whose good intentions for what remained of its Indies 
empire inspire it to develop, materially, spiritually and politically, a new sense of 
identity.  This is, of course, an uneven moral contest, even if in the end the pressure of 
world opinion (and especially the will of a new American administration determined 
not to upset the Indonesians too much is an increasingly dangerous Southeast Asia) 
sees the defeat of the morally upright.  Finally overwhelmed, the powerless 
Netherlands is forced to hand over New Guinea to the United Nations, and then to an 
Indonesian administration which, we are not surprised to find, employs skulduggery, 
brutality, and the strategic invocation of alleged Indonesian cultural values to arrange 
an act of free choice which it can never lose.  Relieved that the problem is over, the 
United Nations and its members acquiesce in the charade. 
 
There is, of course, a great deal of truth in the story Drooglever presents.  And yet, 
partly for reasons to do with his aims, partly, perhaps, because of his lack of access to 
Indonesian official sources, but mainly, I think, because of the moral frame in which 
the book is presented, it is not a wholly accurate and thus misleading account because 
of its failure adequately to come to grips with the Indonesian drive for national 
integrity.  It is something of a puzzle to those who know little of Indonesian 
nationalism that Indonesia was prepared to invest so much effort, money, and its good 
name as well as the blood of its sons to secure a remote part of the former Netherlands 
East Indies.  As Drooglever himself points out, some prominent nationalist leaders, 
notably Hatta, thought little of marginal New Guinea and were not especially troubled 
at the prospect of its “loss”.  Even earlier, Syahrir, travelling through eastern 
Indonesia on his way to exile in Digul early in 1935, was struck by feelings of 
distance and isolation.  In the fashion of a tourist in a new land, he remarked “how 
beautiful this eastern part of our country is”1  Of eastern Indonesia there was, indeed, 
a certain disdain; “from a social point of view this part of Indonesia has almost no 
                                                
1  Soetan Sjahrir, Out of exile, trans. Charles Wolf Jr. (repr. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969 [1949]), p. 44 (11 February 
1935).  See also p. 46 (21 February 1935). 
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meaning”.2  And yet for most Indonesians this was—and had always been—an 
integral part their country, even if they knew nothing of it and even if many of them 
were wont to treat its indigenous inhabitants with patronising contempt.  The social 
will which had been manifested in the August 1945 proclamation was matter of the 
exercise of leaders acting in the name of the people and thus a matter of right, the 
reclamation, by force if necessary, of a history and an identity previously lost to 
European colonialism.  It was not something subject to plebiscites or the plaything of 
locally popular interests, any more than, say, an Australian federal government would 
countenance the loss of one of its constituent states through a local exercise in the 
right of self-determination. 
 
Put in this way, it is perhaps easier to understand the depth of Indonesian wrath at the 
fact that its relative impotence in the 1949 negotiations had resulted in the excision of 
a integral part of its being.  While it is certainly true that this sense of nationalist 
humiliation was ruthlessly and shamelessly employed, especially after 1954, by 
Sukarno and other actors in domestic Indonesian politics (notably the army) for their 
own political advantage, there can be no doubting the fact the very presence of a 
Dutch occupied New Guinea was a continuing slight to a great many Indonesians, 
something which gave the political ploys of Sukarno and other their pungency and 
immediacy.  Seen from this vantage point, the unswerving, and gradually heightening 
demands of the Republic for the restoration of its wholeness takes on a new light, and 
the efforts of the Dutch to nurture and develop a Papuan elite begin to look less like 
the well-intentioned desire for the realisation of self-determinations and rather more 
like the irresponsible sowing of seeds of discord—seeds which were to come to 
fruition in good time—within the Indonesian nation.  This dimension of the analysis is 
almost wholly lacking in Drooglever’s analysis, and represents a crippling deficiency 
in what is otherwise a superbly crafted piece of work. 
 
How might the deficiency have been made good?  Within Drooglever’s given moral 
frame of reference, such would be impossible, since the whole tenor of the book is to 
represent the fact that good intentions for the sake of a small and weak people is 
noble, even if it is sometimes misconceived and unthinking, and even if it ultimately 
results in failure.  But Drooglever’s failure to attempt to understand the underlying 
dynamic of the Indonesian nationalist impulse, and the consequent tenacity of its 
eventually victorious diplomacy, presents an unnervingly one-sided account of a 
complex and many-sided problem.  Given that he is so clearly a scholar who seeks to 
write without preconceptions and who seeks to achieve “a reasonable measure of 
objectivity” (p. 15), one wonders whether a more thorough exposure to Indonesians 
and Indonesia-centric sources ( I counted just nine Indonesian-language books in the 
bibliography, and no reference at all to any Indonesian newspapers) might have 
caused him to reframe that moral frame, and perhaps to cast what is currently flagged 
as the humane and well-intended hopes of the Netherlands as silly, misconceived, 
conceited policy, which itself resulted, in the given context, in unmeasured suffering 
and a trauma which has not yet run its course. 
 
In an important sense, Drooglever’s book adds nothing of great significance to what is 
now a well-known tale:  of Dutch conniving to deprive the Indonesian Republic of the 
final victory it sought and thought it had achieved, of persistent and unconscionable 
                                                
2  Ibid., p. 48 (21 February 1935). 
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Indonesian efforts to reverse their 1949 loss, of a Dutch moral crusade which 
outreached its capacity to achieve its end in the context of a rapidly changing 
international political and moral order, and of subsequent Indonesian scheming, 
connivance, and downright terror in the name of the furtherance of its own moral 
claim.  That much we knew already.  Drooglever’s weighty tome adds depth, 
personality, nuance and scholarly detail to the outlines of that story, and for this we 
are much in his debt.  Would that the missing dimension of his work had been 
included.  But that might have prevented him reaching the smoothly moral 
conclusions he eventually does, that the Dutch, despite their many failings and 
stubbornness, really had their heart in the right place, and that their ultimate failure 
was a function of their essential weakness in a wider world.  That conclusion, I fear, 
lets Dutch policy off too lightly.  In ignoring and thus maligning the strength and the 
unforgiving nature of the post-war Indonesian nationalist project, Drooglever commits 
the same fault as did those Dutch policy makers whose efforts to control change in the 
1940s and 1950s whilst ignoring or attempting to deflect that national will of the 
Indonesians, led in the end to the tragically unresolved “problem” of New Guinea. 
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